Preference exclusions for social rationality

John Duggan ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, vol. 46, issue 1, 93-118

Abstract: I develop sufficient conditions for transitivity and acyclicity of social preferences, continuing the investigation of restricted domains begun by Black (J Polit Econ 56:23–34, 1948 ; The theory of committees and elections. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1958 ), Arrow (Social choice and individual values. Wiley, New York, 1951 ), and Sen (Econometrica 34:491–499, 1966 ; Rev Econ Stud 36:381–393, 1969 ). The approach, which excludes certain triples of rankings over triples of alternatives, contributes to the literature in three ways. First, I generalize majority rule to classes of social preference relations defined by their decisiveness properties. Second, I consider not only transitivity of weak and strict social preference, but I provide conditions for acyclic strict preference as well. Third, the well-known conditions of value restriction, single peakedness, and order restriction are shown to satisfy corresponding exclusion conditions, so transitivity results on these domains follow from the more general analysis; in particular, the results are applied to weakly single-peaked preference profiles, and a result on acyclicity due to Austen-Smith and Banks (Positive political theory I. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1999 ) is obtained as a special case. In contrast to the latter authors, the approach fixes a single preference profile and does not rely on the properties of social preferences as individual preferences are varied. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0906-3

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