Barefoot and footloose doctors: optimal resource allocation in developing countries with medical migration

John Roemer and Pedro Rosa Dias ()
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Pedro Rosa Dias: Imperial College London

Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, vol. 46, issue 2, No 5, 335-358

Abstract: Abstract In light of the shortage of healthcare professionals, many developing countries operate a de facto two-tiered system of healthcare provision, in which Community Health Workers (CHWs) supplement service provision by fully qualified physicians. CHWs are relatively inexpensive to train but can treat only a limited range of medical conditions. This paper explicitly models a two-tiered structure of healthcare provision and characterizes the optimal allocation of resources between training doctors and CHWs, and implications for population health outcomes. We analyze how medical migration alters resource allocation and population health outcomes, shifting resources towards training CHWs. In the model, migration stimulates health care provision at the lower end of the illness severity spectrum, improving health outcomes for those patients; sufferers of relatively severe medical conditions who can only be treated by doctors are made worse off. It is further shown that donor countries must be reimbursed by at least the training cost of emigrating physicians in order to restore aggregate population health to the pre-migration level.

Date: 2016
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Journal Article: Barefoot and footloose doctors: optimal resource allocation in developing countries with medical migration (2016)
Working Paper: Barefoot and Footloose Doctors: Optimal Resource Allocation in Developing Countries with Medical Migration (2015)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0916-1

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