Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism
Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, vol. 46, issue 3, No 3, 520 pages
Abstract We consider two natural notions of strategyproofness in random object-assignment mechanisms based on ordinal preferences. The two notions are stronger than weak strategyproofness but weaker than strategyproofness. We demonstrate that the two notions are equivalent, provide a geometric characterization of the new intermediate property which we call convex strategyproofness, and then show that the (generalized) probabilistic serial mechanism is, in fact, convexly strategyproof. We finish by showing that the property of weak envy-freeness of the random serial dictatorship can be strengthened in an analogous manner.
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