Multilevel multidimensional consistent aggregators

Mihir Bhattacharya

Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, vol. 46, issue 4, No 6, 839-861

Abstract: Abstract This paper examines the structure of consistent, multidimensional, multilevel aggregators in two distinct models- one, where the set of evaluations is the unit interval and the other, where it is finite. In the first model, we characterize a class of separable rules called component-wise $$\alpha $$ α -median rules. In the finite model, separability is no longer guaranteed. In addition to consistency, stronger notions of unanimity and anonymity are required to characterize a class of separable rules called bipartite rules.

Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-015-0938-8 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Multilevel multidimensional consistent aggregators (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:46:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-015-0938-8

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0938-8

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().