Toss one’s cake, and eat it too: partial divisions can improve social welfare in cake cutting
Orit Arzi (),
Yonatan Aumann () and
Yair Dombb ()
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Orit Arzi: Bar-Ilan University
Yonatan Aumann: Bar-Ilan University
Yair Dombb: Bar-Ilan University
Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, vol. 46, issue 4, No 11, 933-954
Abstract:
Abstract We consider the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous good (a.k.a. “cake”) between a number of players with different tastes. In this setting, it is known that fairness requirements may result in a suboptimal division from the social welfare standpoint. Here we show that, in some cases, leaving some of the cake unallocated, and fairly dividing only the remainder of the cake may be socially preferable to any fair division of the entire cake. We study this phenomenon, providing asymptotically-tight bounds on the social improvement achievable by such partial divisions.
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0943-y
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