On surplus-sharing in partnerships

Özgür Kıbrıs and Arzu Kıbrıs
Additional contact information
Arzu Kıbrıs: Sabancı University

Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, vol. 47, issue 1, No 5, 89-111

Abstract: Abstract For investment or professional service partnerships (in general, for partnerships where measures of the partners’ contributions are available), we consider a family of partnership agreements commonly used in real life. They allocate a fixed fraction of the surplus equally and the remains, proportional to contributions; and they allow this fraction to depend on whether the surplus is positive or negative. We analyze the implications of such partnership agreements on (i) whether the partnership forms in the first place, and if it does, (ii) the partners’ contributions as well as (iii) their welfare. We then inquire which partnership agreements are productively efficient (i.e. maximizes the partners’ total contributions) and which are socially efficient, (i.e. maximizes the partners’ social welfare as formulated by the two seminal measures of egalitarianism and utilitarianism).

Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-015-0947-7 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:47:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-015-0947-7

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-015-0947-7

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().