Non-bossiness

William Thomson

Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, vol. 47, issue 3, No 10, 665-696

Abstract: Abstract An allocation rule is “non-bossy” if whenever a change in an agent’s preferences does not bring about a change in his assignment, then it does not bring about a change in anybody’s assignment. We discuss the multiple interpretations that have been proposed for this property. We question their validity, arguing that in most cases, non-bossiness either says too little or that it says too much. We also make a case against the property. We propose as its main justification the technical help that it often provides in structuring classes of rules, making characterizations more manageable.

JEL-codes: C79 D63 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-016-0987-7 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Non-bossiness (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:47:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-016-0987-7

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-0987-7

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().