Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice

Paula Jaramillo

Social Choice and Welfare, 2017, vol. 48, issue 1, No 9, 177-195

Abstract: Abstract We consider school choice problems. We are interested in solutions that satisfy consistency. Consider a problem and a recommendation made by the solution for the problem. Suppose some students are removed with their positions in schools. Consider the “reduced” problem consisting of the remaining students and the remaining positions. Consistency states that in the reduced problem, the solution should assign each remaining student to the same school as initially. Neither the immediate acceptance rule (also known as the Boston mechanism) nor the top trading cycles rules is consistent. We show that the Pareto solution is the smallest consistent solution containing the immediate acceptance rule. It is also the smallest consistent solution containing the top trading cycles rule.

Date: 2017
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Working Paper: Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice (2014)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-0954-3

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