Conundrums for nonconsequentialists

John Weymark

Social Choice and Welfare, 2017, vol. 48, issue 2, No 2, 269-294

Abstract: Abstract There are a number of single-profile impossibility theorems in social choice theory and welfare economics that demonstrate the incompatibility of unanimity/dominance criteria with various nonconsequentialist principles given some rationality restrictions on the rankings being considered. This article is concerned with examining what they have in common and how they differ. Groups of results are identified that have similar formal structures and are established using similar proof strategies.

Keywords: Utility Function; Social Ranking; Impossibility Theorem; Pareto Principle; Utility Vector (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Conundrums for Nonconsequentialists (2013)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-1021-9

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