Properties of multiwinner voting rules
Edith Elkind (),
Piotr Faliszewski (),
Piotr Skowron () and
Arkadii Slinko ()
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Edith Elkind: University of Oxford
Piotr Faliszewski: AGH University
Piotr Skowron: University of Oxford
Arkadii Slinko: University of Auckland
Social Choice and Welfare, 2017, vol. 48, issue 3, 599-632
Abstract A committee selection rule (or, multiwinner voting rule) is a mapping that takes a collection of strict preference rankings and a positive integer k as input, and outputs one or more subsets of candidates of size k. In this paper we consider committee selection rules that can be viewed as generalizations of single-winner scoring rules, including SNTV, Bloc, k-Borda, STV, as well as several variants of the Chamberlin–Courant rule and the Monroe rule and their approximations. We identify two natural broad classes of committee selection rules, and show that many of the existing rules belong to one or both of these classes. We then formulate a number of desirable properties of committee selection rules, and evaluate the rules we consider with respect to these properties.
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