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Axiomatizations of the equal-loss and weighted equal-loss bargaining solutions

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Social Choice and Welfare, 2017, vol. 49, issue 1, No 1, 9 pages

Abstract: Abstract The 2-person equal-loss bargaining solution (Chun Econ Lett 26:103–106, 1988) is characterized on the basis of the following axioms: concavity, Pareto optimality, symmetry, and restricted monotonicity. Replacing symmetry by strong individual rationality and extending the bargaining domain so that it contains a degenerate problem that consists solely of the disagreement point results in a characterization of a weighted version of the equal-loss solution.

Keywords: Ideal Point; Pareto Optimality; Bargaining Solution; Bargaining Model; Bargaining Problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-017-1045-9

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