Minimum incoming cost rules for arborescences
Eric Bahel () and
Christian Trudeau ()
Social Choice and Welfare, 2017, vol. 49, issue 2, 287-314
Abstract The paper examines minimum cost arborescence (mca) problems, which generalize the well-known minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problems by allowing the cost to depend on the direction of the flow. We propose a new family of cost sharing methods that are easy to compute, as they closely relate to the network-building algorithm. These methods are called minimum incoming cost rules for arborescences (MICRAs). They include as a particular case the extension of the folk solution introduced by Dutta and Mishra [Games Econ Behav 74(1):120–143, 2012], providing a simple procedure for its computation. We also provide new axiomatizations of (a) the set of stable and symmetric MICRAs and (b) the Dutta–Mishra solution. Finally, we closely examine two MICRAs that (unlike the Dutta–Mishra rule) compensate agents who help others connect at a lower cost. The first of these two rules relates to the cycle-complete solution for mcst problems introduced by Trudeau [Games Econ Behav 75(1):402–412, 2012].
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-017-1061-9 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:49:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1061-9
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355
Access Statistics for this article
Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe
More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().