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Relinquishing power, exploitation and political unemployment in democratic organizations

Carmen Bevia (), Luis Corchon () and Antonio Romero-Medina
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Antonio Romero-Medina: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2017, vol. 49, issue 3, 735-753

Abstract: Abstract We analyze the evolution of organizations which take decisions on whom to hire and how to share the output by plurality voting. Agents are grouped in three classes, high, medium and low productivity. We study the evolution of political power and show that in some cases, rational agents who value the future may yield political power to another class. This is what we call the relinquish effect. We show that high productivity agents may receive less than their individual output, i.e. exploitation is possible. We also show that high productivity agents may be left out in the cold because their entrance in an organization may threaten the dominance of other classes. We call this political unemployment.

Date: 2017
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