Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence

Sususmu Cato ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2018, vol. 50, issue 2, No 6, 305-328

Abstract: Abstract Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that if an aggregation rule satisfies unrestricted domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and collective rationality, then there exists a dictator. Among others, Arrow’s postulate of collective rationality is controversial. We propose a new axiom for an aggregation rule, decisiveness coherence, which is weaker than collective rationality. It is shown that given the Arrovian axioms other than collective rationality, a dictatorship arises if and only if decisiveness coherence is satisfied. Moreover, we introduce weak versions of decisive coherence and examine these implications.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-017-1085-1

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