The socially acceptable scoring rule

Muhammad Mahajne and Oscar Volij ()
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Muhammad Mahajne: Ben Gurion University of the Negev

Social Choice and Welfare, 2018, vol. 51, issue 2, No 2, 223-233

Abstract: Abstract We say that an alternative is socially acceptable if the number of individuals that rank it among their most preferred half of the alternatives is at least as large as the number of individuals that rank it among the least preferred half. We show that there exists a unique scoring rule that always selects a subset of socially acceptable alternatives.

Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-018-1113-9

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