Revealed votes

Andrei Gomberg

Social Choice and Welfare, 2018, vol. 51, issue 2, No 5, 296 pages

Abstract: Abstract In this paper I consider choice correspondences defined on a novel domain: the decisions are assumed to be taken not by individuals, but by committees, whose membership is observable and variable. In particular, for the case of two alternatives I provide a full characterization of committee choice structures that may be rationalized with two common decision rules: unanimity with a default and weighted majority.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-018-1116-6

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