How to rank rankings? Group performance in multiple-prize contests
Alejandro Corvalan ()
Social Choice and Welfare, 2018, vol. 51, issue 2, 361-380
Abstract When groups of individuals compete in several multiple-prize contests, the performance of a group is a vector of ordered categories. As the prizes are aimed at ranking the participants, group performances are not trivially comparable. This note provides a theoretical discussion on how to rank group performances. In order to do so, I draw from the parallel that this problem has with the formally similar problem of measuring inequality. I describe three alternatives that generate partial orders for group performances. I define partial orders based on the first- and second-order dominance, two classes of performance measures, and two sets of basic transformations, and I prove equivalence theorems between them. I apply these theoretical results to discuss several sports ranking problems.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-018-1120-x Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:51:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-018-1120-x
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355
Access Statistics for this article
Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe
More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().