The Electoral College, battleground states, and rule-utilitarian voting

Andrew Jorgenson and Martin Saavedra ()
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Andrew Jorgenson: Western Washington University

Social Choice and Welfare, 2018, vol. 51, issue 4, No 1, 577-593

Abstract: Abstract We extend the Feddersen and Sandroni (Am Econ Rev 96(4):1271–1282, 2006) voter turnout model to include partisan districts, a battleground district, and an Electoral College. We find that expected voter turnout by a single party is highest in the battleground district, followed by the party’s majority district, which in turn is followed by the party’s minority district. Total turnout is higher in the battleground district than in the partisan districts, but the gap decreases as the level of disagreement in the partisan districts increases. Lastly, turnout in the battleground district decreases as the partisan districts become more competitive.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-018-1128-2

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