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The impact of redistribution mechanisms in the vote with the wallet game: experimental results

Leonardo Becchetti, Vittorio Pelligra and Francesco Salustri

Social Choice and Welfare, 2018, vol. 51, issue 4, No 2, 595-619

Abstract: Abstract We use the vote-with-the-wallet game to model socially or environmentally responsible consumption, an increasingly relevant but still under-researched phenomenon. Based on a theoretical model outlining game equilibria and the parametric interval of the related multiplayer prisoners’ dilemma we evaluate with a controlled lab experiment players’ behaviour in the game and test the effects of an ex post redistribution mechanism between defectors and cooperators. Our findings document that the redistribution mechanism interrupts cooperation decay and stabilizes the share of cooperators at a level significantly higher, even though inferior to the Nash equilibrium.

Date: 2018
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Working Paper: The Impact of Redistribution Mechanisms in the Vote with the Wallet Game: Experimental Results (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: The Impact of Redistribution Mechanisms in the Vote with the Wallet Game: Experimental Results (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: The Impact of Redistribution Mechanisms in the Vote with the Wallet Game: Experimental Results (2015) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-018-1130-8

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