On some oligarchy results when social preference is fuzzy

Conal Duddy () and Ashley Piggins ()
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Conal Duddy: National University of Ireland Galway

Social Choice and Welfare, 2018, vol. 51, issue 4, No 6, 717-735

Abstract: Abstract We consider a model in which individual preferences are orderings of social states, but the social preference relation is fuzzy. We motivate interest in the model by presenting a version of the strong Pareto rule that is suited to the setting of a fuzzy social preference. We prove a general oligarchy theorem under the assumption that this fuzzy relation is quasi-transitive. The framework allows us to make a distinction between a “strong” and a “weak” oligarchy, and our theorem identifies when the oligarchy must be strong and when it can be weak. Weak oligarchy need not be undesirable.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-018-1134-4

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