Welfare egalitarianism with other-regarding preferences

Rafael Treibich

Social Choice and Welfare, 2019, vol. 52, issue 1, No 1, 28 pages

Abstract: Abstract We consider the problem of dividing a perfectly divisible good among individuals who have other-regarding preferences. Assuming no legitimate claims and purely ordinal preferences, how should society measure social welfare so as to satisfy basic principles of efficiency and fairness? In a simple model of average externalities, we characterize the class of social preferences which give full priority to the individual with the lowest egalitarian equivalent.

Date: 2019
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Working Paper: Welfare Egalitarianism with Other-Regarding Preferences (2014)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-018-1135-3

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