Dividing bads under additive utilities
Herve Moulin (),
Fedor Sandomirskiy and
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Elena Yanovskaia: Higher School of Economics
Social Choice and Welfare, 2019, vol. 52, issue 3, No 1, 395-417
Abstract We compare the Egalitarian rule (aka Egalitarian Equivalent) and the Competitive rule (aka Comeptitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes) to divide bads (chores). They are both welfarist: the competitive disutility profile(s) are the critical points of their Nash product on the set of efficient feasible profiles. The C rule is Envy Free, Maskin Monotonic, and has better incentives properties than the E rule. But, unlike the E rule, it can be wildly multivalued, admits no selection continuous in the utility and endowment parameters, and is harder to compute. Thus in the division of bads, unlike that of goods, no rule normatively dominates the other.
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