Egalitarianism, utilitarianism, and the Nash bargaining solution

Shiran Rachmilevitch ()
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Shiran Rachmilevitch: University of Haifa

Social Choice and Welfare, 2019, vol. 52, issue 4, No 7, 751 pages

Abstract: Abstract A bargaining solution satisfies egalitarian–utilitarian monotonicity (EUM) if the following holds under feasible-set-expansion: a decrease in the value of the Rawlsian (resp. utilitarian) objective is accompanied by an increase in the value of the utilitarian (resp. Rawlsian) objective. A bargaining solution is welfarist if it maximizes a symmetric and strictly concave social welfare function. Every 2-person welfarist solution satisfies EUM, but for $$n\ge 3$$ n ≥ 3 every n-person welfarist solution violates it. In the presence of other standard axioms, EUM characterizes the Nash solution in the 2-person case, but leads to impossibility in the n-person case.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-018-01170-6

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