The space of all proportional voting systems and the most majoritarian among them

Pietro Speroni di Fenizio () and Daniele A. Gewurz ()
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Pietro Speroni di Fenizio: Università degli Studi G. D’Annunzio di Chieti Pescara

Social Choice and Welfare, 2019, vol. 52, issue 4, No 4, 663-683

Abstract: Abstract We present an alternative voting system that aims at bridging the gap between proportional representative systems and majoritarian electoral systems. The system lets people vote for multiple party-lists, but then assigns each ballot paper to a single party. This opens a whole range of possible parliaments, all proportionally representative. We show theoretically that this space is convex. Then among the possible parliaments we present an algorithm to produce the most majoritarian result. We then test the system and compare the results with a pure proportional and a majoritarian voting system showing how the results are comparable with the majoritarian system. Then we simulate the system and show how it tends to produce parties of exponentially decreasing size with always a first, major party with about half of the seats. Finally we describe how the system can be used in the context of a parliament made up of two separate houses.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-018-1166-9

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