Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval

Abhinaba Lahiri () and Ton Storcken ()
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Abhinaba Lahiri: Indian Institute of Science Education
Ton Storcken: Maastricht University

Social Choice and Welfare, 2019, vol. 53, issue 1, No 3, 49-62

Abstract: Abstract We consider collective decision rules placing finitely many public bads in a region, modeled by a line segment. Agents’ preferences are lexicographic extensions (lexmin) of Euclidean single dipped preferences on this interval. The class of all rules satisfying strategy-proofness and Pareto optimality is characterized. These rules pick only boundary locations by monotone voting.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-018-01169-z

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