Intensity valence

Fabian Gouret and Stéphane Rossignol

Social Choice and Welfare, 2019, vol. 53, issue 1, No 4, 63-112

Abstract: Abstract We study a continuous one-dimensional spatial model of electoral competition with two office-motivated candidates differentiated by their “intensity valence”, the degree to which they will implement their announced policy. The model generates results that differ significantly from those obtained in models with additive valence. First, the low intensity valence candidate is supported by voters with ideal points on both extremes of the policy space. Second, there exist pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in which the high intensity valence candidate wins if the distribution of voters in the policy space is sufficiently homogeneous. If, instead, this distribution is sufficiently heterogeneous, there are PSNE in which the low intensity valence candidate wins. For moderate heterogeneity, only mixed strategy equilibria exist.

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Intensity valence (2019)
Working Paper: Intensity valence (2016)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-019-01173-x

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