Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts

Haris Aziz () and Bettina Klaus ()
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Haris Aziz: UNSW Sydney and Data61, CSIRO

Social Choice and Welfare, 2019, vol. 53, issue 2, No 4, 213-259

Abstract: Abstract We consider stability concepts for random matchings where agents have preferences over objects and objects have priorities for the agents. When matchings are deterministic, the standard stability concept also captures the fairness property of no (justified) envy. When matchings can be random, there are a number of natural stability and fairness concepts that coincide with stability and no envy whenever matchings are deterministic. We formalize known stability concepts for random matchings for a general setting that allows weak preferences and weak priorities, unacceptability, and an unequal number of agents and objects. We then present a clear taxonomy of the stability concepts and identify logical relations between them. Finally, we present a transformation from the most general setting to the most restricted setting, and show how almost all our stability concepts are preserved by that transformation.

Date: 2019
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Working Paper: Random Matching under Priorities: Stability and No Envy Concepts (2017)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-019-01181-x

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