Dilemma with approval and disapproval votes

Stéphane Gonzalez (), Annick Laruelle () and Philippe Solal

Social Choice and Welfare, 2019, vol. 53, issue 3, No 7, 497-517

Abstract: Abstract This paper looks at the issue of selecting candidates when the votes cast in ballots enable voters to approve or disapprove each candidate. More precisely, three options are offered: voters can approve, disapprove or remain neutral in regard to each candidate. We define a large family of rules that satisfy desirable properties and prove that solving a dilemma is sufficient to characterize any rule which belongs to this family. In this context a dilemma appears when candidates with only neutral votes face candidates with both supporters and opponents. On the basis of this result, we provide comparable axiomatizations of four rules including some proposed in the literature.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-019-01194-6

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