Dilemma with approval and disapproval votes
Stéphane Gonzalez (),
Annick Laruelle () and
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Stéphane Gonzalez: Université de Saint-Etienne, UMR 5824 GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne
Social Choice and Welfare, 2019, vol. 53, issue 3, 497-517
Abstract This paper looks at the issue of selecting candidates when the votes cast in ballots enable voters to approve or disapprove each candidate. More precisely, three options are offered: voters can approve, disapprove or remain neutral in regard to each candidate. We define a large family of rules that satisfy desirable properties and prove that solving a dilemma is sufficient to characterize any rule which belongs to this family. In this context a dilemma appears when candidates with only neutral votes face candidates with both supporters and opponents. On the basis of this result, we provide comparable axiomatizations of four rules including some proposed in the literature.
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