A characterization of the single-peaked single-crossing domain

Edith Elkind (), Piotr Faliszewski () and Piotr Skowron ()
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Edith Elkind: University of Oxford
Piotr Faliszewski: AGH University
Piotr Skowron: University of Warsaw

Social Choice and Welfare, 2020, vol. 54, issue 1, No 7, 167-181

Abstract: Abstract We characterize elections that are simultaneously single-peaked and single-crossing (SPSC), by establishing a connection between this domain and that of minimally rich elections, i.e., elections where each candidate is ranked first by at least one voter. Specifically, we show that an election is both single-peaked and single-crossing if and only if it can be obtained from a minimally rich single-crossing election by deleting voters.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-019-01216-3

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