Priority and proportionality in bankruptcy

Karol Flores-Szwagrzak (), Jaume García-Segarra () and Miguel Ginés-Vilar ()
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Karol Flores-Szwagrzak: Copenhagen Business School
Jaume García-Segarra: University of Cologne
Miguel Ginés-Vilar: University Jaume I of Castellón

Social Choice and Welfare, 2020, vol. 54, issue 4, No 3, 559-579

Abstract: Abstract We study the problem of distributing the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm among its creditors (O’Neill, Math Soc Sci 2(4):345–371, 1982; Aumann and Maschler, J Econ Theory 36(2):195–213, 1985). Real-life distribution rules prioritize predetermined creditor groups, dividing the amount assigned to each group proportionally to claims. We provide the first axiomatic characterization of such rules. In addition to the classical consistency and continuity axioms, these rules are characterized by the following properties: (1) bankruptcy problems with the same claims and where each claimant’s award is positive in each problem can be solved either jointly or separately without altering the recommended awards, (2) a dual property specifying that bankruptcy problems with the same claims and where each claimant’s loss is positive can be solved either jointly or separately without altering the recommended awards.

JEL-codes: D63 D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-019-01219-0

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