Neutral freedom and freedom as control

Itai Sher ()
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Itai Sher: University of Massachusetts Amherst

Social Choice and Welfare, 2021, vol. 56, issue 1, No 2, 56 pages

Abstract: Abstract I present a model of freedom as control. Control is measured by the preferences of a decision-maker, or judge, who values flexibility and is neutral towards outcomes ex ante. Formally, I explore the consequences of adding a neutrality axiom to the Dekel et al. (Econometrica 69(4):891–934, 2001) axioms for preference for flexibility. I characterize the consensus of all neutral judges about which choice situations embody more freedom. The theory extends the freedom ranking literature to situations where agents have imperfect control, as modeled by choices among lotteries. In a voting context, the consensus of neutral judges coincides with Banzhaf power.

Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01267-x

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