Power in the Council of the EU: organizing theory, a new index, and Brexit

Philip D. Grech ()
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Philip D. Grech: ETH Zurich

Social Choice and Welfare, 2021, vol. 56, issue 2, No 2, 223-258

Abstract: Abstract We aim to estimate the power distribution in the Council of the European Union—both a priori and a posteriori. With respect to the latter, our analysis suggests that several previously used indices are ill-suited for this application. By introducing minimal modifications, we propose a new index and compare it with previous constructions in a unified framework. Empirically, we find that that all countries gain a priori voting power in the Council as a result of Brexit. We rely on data from the Chapel Hill Expert survey to compute a posteriori power and find that it is more unequally distributed than a priori power. Specifically, a posteriori power is almost exclusively held by relatively few rather populous states (yet not the United Kingdom). As regards Brexit, France appears as the main benefactor in terms of gaining a posteriori power; Poland loses substantive power in several areas but remains one of the most powerful EU member states.

Keywords: A posteriori voting power; Council of the European Union; Brexit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01273-z

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