Axiomatizations for the Shapley–Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output

Sascha Kurz (), Issofa Moyouwou and Hilaire Touyem
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Sascha Kurz: University of Bayreuth
Issofa Moyouwou: University of Yaounde I
Hilaire Touyem: University of Yaounde I

Social Choice and Welfare, 2021, vol. 56, issue 3, No 7, 569-594

Abstract: Abstract The Shapley–Shubik index is a specialization of the Shapley value and is widely applied to evaluate the power distribution in committees drawing binary decisions. It was generalized to decisions with more than two levels of approval both in the input and the output. The corresponding games are called (j, k) simple games. Here we present a new axiomatization for the Shapley–Shubik index for (j, k) simple games as well as for a continuous variant, which may be considered as the limit case.

Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01296-6

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