No individual priorities and the Nash bargaining solution

Shiran Rachmilevitch ()
Additional contact information
Shiran Rachmilevitch: University of Haifa

Social Choice and Welfare, 2021, vol. 56, issue 4, No 8, 855-863

Abstract: Abstract A bargaining solution satisfies no individual priorities (NIP) if the following holds: if x is the selected utility allocation and $$\pi x$$ π x is also feasible, where $$\pi $$ π is some permutation, then $$x=\pi x$$ x = π x . I characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the basis of this axiom, non-triviality (the disagreement point is never selected), and scale covariance. An additional characterization is presented for the 2-person case, in which NIP is weakened and symmetry is added.

Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-020-01302-x Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:56:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01302-x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01302-x

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().