Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals

Mathieu Martin (), Zéphirin Nganmeni and Craig A. Tovey
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Mathieu Martin: Cergy Paris Université
Zéphirin Nganmeni: Paris 8 University
Craig A. Tovey: Georgia Institute of Technology

Social Choice and Welfare, 2021, vol. 57, issue 1, No 10, 195 pages

Abstract: Abstract We introduce a dominance relationship in spatial voting with Euclidean preferences, by treating voter ideal points as balls of radius $$\delta$$ δ . Values $$\delta >0$$ δ > 0 model imprecision or ambiguity as to voter preferences from the perspective of a social planner. The winning coalitions may be any consistent monotonic collection of voter subsets. We characterize the minimum value of $$\delta$$ δ for which the $$\delta$$ δ -core, the set of undominated points, is nonempty. In the case of simple majority voting, the core is the yolk center and $$\delta$$ δ is the yolk radius.

Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01316-z

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