EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings

Encarnación Algaba (), Stefano Moretti (), Eric Rémila () and Philippe Solal
Additional contact information
Encarnación Algaba: Camino de los Descubrimientos, s/n
Stefano Moretti: LAMSADE, CNRS, Université Paris-Dauphine, Université PSL
Eric Rémila: Université de Saint-Etienne, CNRS, GATE Lyon-St-Etienne UMR 5824

Social Choice and Welfare, 2021, vol. 57, issue 4, No 6, 817-849

Abstract: Abstract In many real world situations, the design of social rankings over agents or items from a given raking over groups or coalitions, to which these agents or items belong to, is of big interest. With this aim, we revise the lexicographic excellence solution and introduce two novel solutions which, moreover, take into account the size of the groups. We present some desirable axioms which are interpreted in this context. Next, a comparable axiomatization of these three solutions is established, revealing the main differences among the two new social rankings and the lexicographic excellence solution. Finally, we apply the three social rankings under study to a real scenario. Specifically, the performance of some football players of Paris Saint-Germain during the UEFA Champions League according to these three rules is analyzed.

Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-021-01340-z Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:57:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-021-01340-z

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01340-z

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-08
Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:57:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-021-01340-z