Group formation in a dominance-seeking contest

Dongryul Lee () and Pilwon Kim ()
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Dongryul Lee: Sungshin University
Pilwon Kim: UNIST (Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology)

Social Choice and Welfare, 2022, vol. 58, issue 1, No 3, 39-68

Abstract: Abstract We study a group formation game. Players with different strengths form groups before expending effort to win a prize. The prize has the nature of the reward for outdoing in competition such as holding a dominant position among players or being recognized as a dominant status. So, it has the nature of public goods within a winning group (group-specific public goods). In open membership game, we find that a single player stays alone and the others form a group together in equilibrium. The stand-alone player can be anyone except for the first and second strongest players in the contest. However, strong (Nash) equilibrium predicts that the weakest player is isolated. Similarly, we find that in exclusive membership game, every structure can emerge in equilibrium but the weakest player is isolated in the strong equilibrium.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01346-7

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