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When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?

Zhenhua Jiao (), Ziyang Shen () and Guoqiang Tian
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Zhenhua Jiao: Shanghai University of International Business and Economics

Social Choice and Welfare, 2022, vol. 58, issue 2, No 3, 257-282

Abstract: Abstract For school choice with affirmative action, responsiveness is used as a measure of how a matching mechanism performs in terms of a certain type of affirmative action policy. We know that the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism is not responsive to the priority-based affirmative action on the universal domain of school choice problems. As a further study, we show in this paper that, the DA mechanism is responsive to the priority-based affirmative action if and only if the exogenous school choice structure (ESCS), which is given by the set of students, the set of schools, the schools’ capacity profile, and schools’ original priority structure, satisfies an acyclicity condition characterized in this paper. This acyclicity condition is stronger than Doğan’s acyclicity, which is the necessary and sufficient condition for the DA mechanism to be responsive to the reserved-based affirmative action.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01357-4

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