Evolutionary stability of preferences: altruism, selfishness, and envy

Sung-Hoon Park () and Jeong-Yoo Kim

Social Choice and Welfare, 2022, vol. 58, issue 2, No 7, 349-363

Abstract: Abstract This paper examines evolutionary stability of preferences in games with strategic complements or substitutes following the indirect evolutionary approach. Preferences are classified into three types: altruism, selfishness, and envy. Depending on the nature of a game (one with strategic substitutes or complements), envy or altruism respectively is strictly dominated. Based on this, we show that an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) exists in which selfishness and envy survive together in games with strategic substitutes, whereas no ESS exists in which altruism and selfishness coexist in games with strategic complements.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01361-8

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