The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: an experimental comparison

Tatsuki Homma (), Ryosuke Iba (), Junyi Shen, Takuma Wakayama, Hirofumi Yamamura () and Takehiko Yamato ()
Additional contact information
Tatsuki Homma: Tokyo Institute of Technology
Ryosuke Iba: Tokyo Institute of Technology
Hirofumi Yamamura: Komazawa University
Takehiko Yamato: Tokyo Institute of Technology

Social Choice and Welfare, 2022, vol. 58, issue 3, No 2, 429-505

Abstract: Abstract We conduct an experimental comparison of two well-known mechanisms for undertaking a binary public project: the pivotal mechanism and the voluntary contribution mechanism. We compare the two mechanisms under complete information in which each subject knows the other subjects’ payoffs. We then observe that the voluntary contribution mechanism works better than the pivotal mechanism from the perspectives of Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and surplus maximization. On the other hand, there is no significant difference between the two mechanisms in terms of decision efficiency. These results suggest that the voluntary contribution mechanism is more favorable than the pivotal mechanism in practical applications.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-021-01350-x Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: The Pivotal Mechanism Versus the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism: An Experimental Comparison (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:58:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-021-01350-x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01350-x

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().