Strategy-proof and fair reallocation with single-peaked preferences

Zhen Zhao () and Shinji Ohseto ()
Additional contact information
Zhen Zhao: Tohoku University
Shinji Ohseto: Tohoku University

Social Choice and Welfare, 2022, vol. 58, issue 4, No 5, 800 pages

Abstract: Abstract We consider the strategy-proof rules for reallocating individual endowments of an infinitely divisible good when agents’ preferences are single-peaked. In social endowment setting, the seminal work established by Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509–519, 1991) proves that the uniform rule is the unique one which satisfies strategy-proofness, efficiency, and envy-freeness. However, the uniform rule is not so appealing in our model since it disregards the differences in individual endowments. In other words, the uniform rule is not individually rational. In this paper, we propose a new rule named the uniform proportion rule. First, we prove that it is the unique rule which satisfies strategy-proofness, efficiency, and envy-freeness on proportion and we show that it is individually rational. Then, we show that our rule is indeed a member of the class of sequential allotment rules characterized by Barberà et al. (Games Econ Behav 18:1–21, 1997).

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-021-01374-3 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:58:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-021-01374-3

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01374-3

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().