Criteria to compare mechanisms that partially satisfy a property: an axiomatic study

Benoît Decerf () and Francois Woitrin ()
Additional contact information
Francois Woitrin: University of Namur

Social Choice and Welfare, 2022, vol. 58, issue 4, No 7, 835-862

Abstract: Abstract We study criteria that compare mechanisms according to a property (e.g., Pareto efficiency or stability) in the presence of multiple equilibria. The multiplicity of equilibria complicates such comparisons when some equilibria satisfy the property while others do not. We axiomatically characterize three criteria. The first criterion is intuitive and based on highly compelling axioms, but is also very incomplete and not very workable. The other two criteria extend the comparisons made by the first and are more workable. Our results reveal the additional robustness axiom characterizing each of these two criteria.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-021-01376-1 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:58:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-021-01376-1

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01376-1

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().