Childlessness, childfreeness and compensation

Marie-Louise Leroux, Pierre Pestieau and Gregory Ponthiere

Social Choice and Welfare, 2022, vol. 59, issue 1, No 1, 35 pages

Abstract: Abstract We study the design of a fair family policy in an economy where parenthood is regarded either as desirable or as undesirable, and where there is imperfect fertility control, leading to involuntary childlessness/parenthood. Using an equivalent consumption approach in the consumption-fertility space, we show that the identification of the worst-off individuals depends on how the social evaluator fixes the reference fertility level. Adopting the ex post egalitarian criterion (giving priority to the worst off in realized terms), we study the compensation for involuntary childlessness/parenthood. Unlike real-world family policies, the fair family policy does not always involve positive family allowances, and may also include positive childlessness allowances. Our results are robust to assuming asymmetric information and to introducing Assisted Reproductive Technologies.

Date: 2022
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Related works:
Working Paper: Childlessness, Childfreeness and Compensation (2023)
Working Paper: Childlessness, Childfreeness and Compensation (2020)
Working Paper: Childlessness, Childfreeness and Compensation (2019)
Working Paper: Childlessness, childfreeness and compensation (2019)
Working Paper: Childlessness, Childfreeness and Compensation (2019)
Working Paper: Childlessness, Childfreeness and Compensation (2019)
Working Paper: Childlessness, Childfreeness and Compensation (2019)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01379-y

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