Roberts’ weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction

Peter Hammond

Social Choice and Welfare, 2023, vol. 60, issue 1, No 9, 134 pages

Abstract: Abstract Roberts’ “weak neutrality” or “weak welfarism” theorem concerns Sen social welfare functionals which are defined on an unrestricted domain of utility function profiles and satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives, the Pareto condition, and a form of weak continuity. Roberts (Rev Econ Stud 47(2):421–439, 1980) claimed that the induced welfare ordering on social states has a one-way representation by a continuous, monotonic real-valued welfare function defined on the Euclidean space of interpersonal utility vectors—that is, an increase in this welfare function is sufficient, but may not be necessary, for social strict preference. A counter-example shows that weak continuity is insufficient; a minor strengthening to pairwise continuity is proposed instead and its sufficiency demonstrated.

Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Roberts' Weak Welfarism Theorem: A Minor Correction (2020)
Working Paper: Roberts' Weak Welfarism Theorem: A Minor Correction (2020)
Working Paper: Roberts' Weak Welfarism Theorem: A Minor Correction (1999)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01334-x

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