Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice

Aram Grigoryan ()
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Aram Grigoryan: Duke University

Social Choice and Welfare, 2023, vol. 60, issue 3, No 3, 383-396

Abstract: Abstract School districts commonly ration public school seats based on students’ preferences and schools’ priorities. Priorities reflect the school districts’ objectives for reducing busing costs (walk-zone priority) or utilizing siblings’ learning spillovers (sibling priority). I develop a simple modification of the well-studied Top Trading Cycles mechanism that matches schools to higher priority students while preserving the mechanism’s desirable efficiency and incentives properties.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01422-6

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