On the unique core partition of coalition formation games: correction to İnal (2015)

Satoshi Nakada () and Ryo Shirakawa
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Satoshi Nakada: Tokyo University of Science

Social Choice and Welfare, 2023, vol. 60, issue 3, No 8, 517-521

Abstract: Abstract In this note, we consider sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the core partitions of coalition formation games. İnal (Soc Choice Welf 45:745–763, 2015) introduces a sufficient condition called k-acyclicity and claims that this condition is independent of another sufficient condition called top-coalition property. We show that this claim is incorrect and, in particular, k-acyclicity is equivalent to the common ranking property introduced by Banerjee et al. (Soc Choice Welf 18:135–153, 2001), which is a stronger condition than the top-coalition property.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01423-5

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