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Implementation in strong core by codes of rights

Michele Lombardi, Foivos Savva and Nikolas Zivanas ()
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Nikolas Zivanas: University of Glasgow

Social Choice and Welfare, 2023, vol. 60, issue 3, No 7, 503-515

Abstract: Abstract Following the seminal contribution of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018), we re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting where coalitions are fundamental behavioral units, and the outcomes of their interactions are predicted by applying the solution concept of the strong core. The planner’s exercise includes designing a code of rights that specifies the collection of coalitions having the right to block one outcome by moving to another. We provide a complete characterization of the implementable social choice rules.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01425-3

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