Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains

Miho Hong () and Semin Kim ()
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Miho Hong: Yale University
Semin Kim: Yonsei University

Social Choice and Welfare, 2023, vol. 61, issue 2, No 7, 385-411

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies the implications of imposing unanimity and local incentive compatibility on a deterministic social choice function. In an environment with strict ordinal preferences over a finite set of alternatives, we find that tops-onlyness and full incentive compatibility necessarily follow from unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains. Furthermore, we identify a property of preference domains that completely characterizes dictatorial domains within sparsely connected domains.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01457-3

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