Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values

Aditya Vikram

Social Choice and Welfare, 2024, vol. 62, issue 1, No 4, 89-108

Abstract: Abstract We study a model in which a single object is to be allocated among a set of agents whose valuations are interdependent. We define signal-ranking mechanisms and show that if the signal-ranking allocation rule satisfies a combinatorial condition and the valuation functions are additively separable, there exist budget-balanced and ex-post incentive compatible signal-ranking mechanisms. For a restricted setting, we show that the worst-case efficient mechanism of Long et al. (Games Econ Behav 105:9–39, 2017) continues to be worst-case efficient. We also give an example to show that their mechanism is no longer optimal when restrictions are relaxed.

Date: 2024
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-023-01479-x Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:62:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-023-01479-x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01479-x

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().