Cross invariance, the Shapley value, and the Shapley–Shubik power index

Chun-Ting Chen (), Wei-Torng Juang () and Ching-jen Sun
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Chun-Ting Chen: National Taipei University
Wei-Torng Juang: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica

Social Choice and Welfare, 2024, vol. 62, issue 2, No 8, 397-418

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we propose a simple axiom which, along with the axioms of additivity (transfer) and dummy player, characterizes the Shapley value (the Shapley–Shubik power index) on the domain of TU (simple) games. The new axiom, cross invariance, demands payoff invariance on symmetric players across “quasi-symmetric games,” that is, games where excluding null players, all players are symmetric. Additionally, we demonstrate that the axiom of additivity can be replaced by a new axiom called strong monotonicity, or it can be completely dropped if a stronger version of cross invariance is employed. We also show that the weighted Shapley values can be characterized using a weighted variant of cross invariance. Efficiency is derived rather than assumed in our characterizations. This fresh perspective contributes to a deeper understanding of the Shapley value and its applicability.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-023-01490-2

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